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5.1  Background 
In the United States the group of people born between 1946 and 1964 have 
come to be known as the “baby boom generation.” After the end of World War 
11,  birthrates in the United States jumped to a level significantly above long- 
term trends and stayed above generally expected levels until the mid-1 960s. 
Because of  the high birthrates  over this period,  the number of people born 
from 1946 to 1964 constitute an unusually large segment of the total U.S. pop- 
ulation. Because of its size, the baby boom generation has had a more signifi- 
cant effect on various facets of the social structure during its lifetime than other 
birth cohorts represented in the population. 
For example, as the baby boomers entered the education system they placed 
new demands on it. Between  1951 and 1954, the number of  five- and six-year 
old children in the primary education system jumped by 70 percent. From 1950 
to  1970, when the last of  the baby boomers were in school, primary  school 
enrollments jumped from 21 to 34 million students (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1975, 368). Then, as smaller cohorts of children reached school age, school 
enrollments began to fall off, dropping to 28 million students by  1975, and 
then stabilizing at around 28 million by 1980 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1991, 
132).  As they came into the primary school system, the baby boomers created a 
fantastic demand for expanded educational services. As they exited the system, 
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staffing positions were eliminated and schools were closed as student bodies 
were consolidated. 
Counting kindergarten, the typical primary and secondary education program 
in the United States takes 13  years. For the baby boomers who did not go  beyond 
secondary education, the leading edge of the group began to enter the work- 
force in significant numbers by 1964. The Vietnam conflict slowed the entrance 
of the oldest baby boom males, as many of them had a period of military ser- 
vice prior to entering the civilian workforce permanently. Of course, many of 
the baby boomers also pursued a college education. Thus, the baby boomers 
began  to  enter  the  workforce  in  earnest  toward  the  end  of  the  1960s and 
throughout the 1970s. Between  1970 and 1986, the U.S. labor force grew at a 
compound rate of 2.60 percent per year. By  1985, the youngest  of  the baby 
boomers were 21 years of age, and most of those who were going to enter the 
workforce had done so. In the latter half of the 1980s, the U.S. workforce grew 
at an annual rate of  0.45 percent per year (U.S. Bureau of the Census  1975, 
127; 1991, 384). 
Given the predictability of the aging process and the evolving patterns of 
retirement  behavior among workers, it is possible to begin  to anticipate the 
retirement  of  the baby  boom generation.  Given its earlier disruptive effects 
on other aspects of  the socioeconomic  fabric, it is important to consider the 
implications of the baby boomers’ retirements on existing social and economic 
institutions as far in advance of their retirements as possible. The two largest 
sources of  cash income for retirees today are Social Security and employer- 
sponsored  tax-qualified retirement  plans. The extent to which policymakers 
have focused on the long-term  status of the Social Security  system and the 
employer-sponsored pension system varies significantly. 
5.1.1  Social Security Funding and the Baby Boom Generation 
For some time, policymakers have been aware that the baby boom genera- 
tion will pose a particular set of challenges for the Social Security program. 
Traditionally, the Social Security program in the United States had been run 
largely on a pay-as-you-go basis. The 1983 Social Security Amendments, an- 
ticipating the special burden that baby boomers’ retirements would place on 
workers in the future, included provisions for accumulating a substantial trust 
fund to prefund some of the benefits promised to the boomers. In other words, 
the baby boom generation was expected to prefund a larger share of its own 
benefits than prior generations had prefunded their own Social Security retire- 
ment income. The 1983  amendments also reduced the benefits promised to the 
baby boom generation by gradually raising the age at which full benefits would 
be paid, to age 67 after the turn of the century. 
Shortly after the passage of the 1983 amendments, Social Security actuaries 
estimated that the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) trust 
funds would grow from around $27.5 billion in 1983 to about $20.7 trillion in 
2045 (see fig. 5.1). The trust funds were expected to have resources available 113  Population Aging and Private Pension Fund Saving and Asset Markets 
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Fig. 5.1  Projected OASDI trust fund accumulations in current dollars 
Sources: Ballantyne (1983) and Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds (1993, 185). 
to pay promised benefits until the youngest of the baby boomers reached 100 
years of age. In the first projections after the passage of the 1983 amendments, 
OASDI trust funds were projected to be solvent until at least 2063. 
In  almost every year since 1983, the estimates of the accumulations in the 
OASDI trust funds have been revised downward. The most recent projection 
published in April 1993, also shown in fig. 5.1, suggests that the trust funds 
will accumulate to only about $5 trillion dollars around 2025 and will then 
decline to a zero balance in 2036. At that time the baby boomers will range in 
age from 72 to 90. Although their numbers will be declining there will still be 
significant numbers of them depending on their retirement benefits to meet 
their ongoing needs. 
An alternative way to look at the financing of Social Security is to segment 
it into periods. Table 5.1 reflects the Social Security actuaries’ April 1993 long- 
term OASDI financing projections broken into three 25-year periods. For the 
most part, the first 25-year period, from 1993 to 2017, will precede the bulk of 
the baby boom’s claim on the program. The baby boomers first will be eligible 
for early retirement benefits in 2008, and only about half of  them will have 
attained age 62 by 2017. In addition, if the increases in the actuarial reductions 
for early retirement benefits and the increases in actuarial adjustments for de- 
layed retirement have any effect, the baby boomers will proceed into retirement 
somewhat more slowly than prior generations. Even on a purely pay-as-you- 
go basis, the tax  revenues funding OASDI benefits are expected to exceed 
outgo as late as 2015. Over the next 25 years starting in  1993, OASDI has 
projected revenues that are about 7 percent above projected outlays. 
As the baby boom moves fully into retirement, the projected financing situa- 114  Sylvester J. Schieber and John B. Shoven 
Table 5.1  Social Security Income and Cost Rates as Projected under 
Current Law 
Over or Under (-) 
Funding as a Percentage 
Period  Income Rate  Cost Rate  of Income Rate 
1993-2017  12.72  11.87 
2018-42  13.10  15.73 
2043-67  13.18  17.28 
6.76 
-  20.08 
-31.11 
Source: Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds (1993, 26). 
tion for Social Security turns decidedly negative. During the second 25-year 
period reflected in table 5.1, when the majority of the baby boomers expect to 
get the bulk of their lifetime benefits,  the projected  OASDI outlays  exceed 
revenues by 20 percent. In other words, every bit of evidence available to na- 
tional policymakers today indicates that Social Security will not be able pro- 
vide the benefits currently being promised to the baby boom generation on the 
basis of inherent benefit  promises now being held out to them  and existing 
funding legislation. While it is impossible to anticipate exactly how OASDI 
projections might change over the next 5 or 10 years, assuming no change in 
legislative  mandates, the recent history of  continual deterioration in the pro- 
jected actuarial balances of the program leads us to conclude that the future 
may turn out even worse than we now officially anticipate. 
The recent history of major Social Security legislative adjustments, specifi- 
cally including the  1977 and 1983 amendments,  suggests that when  benefit 
promises exceed program revenues, at least part of the rebalancing of the pro- 
gram comes in the form of reduced benefits for retirees. Given the size of the 
baby boom generation  and the potential adjustment that may be required  in 
their Social Security benefit expectations, it seems imperative that policymak- 
ers begin to address the funding of the baby boomers benefits as soon as pos- 
sible so they will have the maximum amount of time to adjust their other retire- 
ment savings relative to more realistic Social Security promises. 
5.1.2  Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plan Funding and the Baby Boom 
Generation 
In the general context of retirement policy it is interesting that there is so 
much consternation about the long-term prospects of Social Security and the 
potential underfunding of benefits for the baby boom generation when there is 
hardly  any  concern  about  the  long-term  prospects  of  the  funded  pension 
system. A  review  of  the  effects  of  recent  legislation  and  contributions  to 
employer-sponsored retirement plans suggests there may be reason for concern 
on the pension front as well. 
Employer-sponsored retirement programs typically operate in a significantly 
different environment than the federal Social Security program. While the fed- I15  Population Aging and Private Pension Fund Saving and Asset Markets 
era1 government  operates its own  employer-sponsored  retirement  programs 
largely  on a pay-as-you-go basis, most  state and local governments prefund 
retirement obligations on some basis, and private  employers are required  to 
fund their retirement obligations on the basis of rules laid out in the Employee 
Retirement  Income  Security  Act  (ERISA)  and  the  Internal  Revenue  Code 
(IRC). 
ERISA became law in 1974. Its purpose was to provide more secure retire- 
ment  benefits  for all  the  participants  in  tax-qualified  plans. Among other 
things, ERISA established rules for including workers in plans, rules for vest- 
ing or guaranteeing  benefits,  and requirements  that benefits  be funded on a 
scheduled basis. In order for a plan to qualify for retirement plan tax prefer- 
ences in the IRC, it must meet certain requirements to assure that the benefits 
being promised are actually provided. For all plans there are fiduciary require- 
ments seeking to assure that the assets are prudently invested  solely for the 
purpose of  providing benefits promised by the plans. In addition, ERISA re- 
quires that plan trustees disclose relevant financial and participation data to the 
government on a periodic basis so that the ongoing viability and operation of 
the plan can be assured. 
For defined-contribution  plans,  the  funding  requirements  are  straightfor- 
ward. On the date that a contribution to the plan is required by the plan rules 
the employer makes a contribution to the plan equal to the obligation. In this 
case, the employer is not obligated to make any additional contributions for 
prior periods. The ability of the plan to provide an adequate retirement benefit 
will depend heavily on the size of the periodic contributions and the investment 
returns to the assets in the plan. 
For defined-benefit  plans  the  funding  requirements  are somewhat  more 
complicated because defined-benefit plans promise future benefits. If a worker 
enters a firm at age 25 and works until age 65 and he is retired under the plan 
for 20 years before  dying, his span of  life under the plan is 60  years. The 
essence of  the ERISA funding requirements  for defined-benefit plans is that 
the employer gradually contribute enough to the plan so that the promised ben- 
efits will be fully funded at the point a worker retires. The annual contribution 
to the plan is determined  on the basis of an actuarial valuation  of the plan’s 
obligations and assets and specific funding minimums and maximums speci- 
fied in the law. The funding minimums in the law are to assure that employers 
are laying aside money to pay promised benefits. The funding maximums are 
in the law to assure that extraordinary contributions are not made to the plan 
simply to avoid paying federal taxes. 
It may seem odd to worry about the funding of employer-sponsored pension 
obligations, at least those of private plan sponsors, when the federal govern- 
ment has seemingly established strong funding and disclosure standards to as- 
sure that promised benefits will ultimately be delivered. The problem is that 
there is an inherent neurosis in federal law governing pensions between the 
provisions aimed at providing retirement income security, on the one hand, and 116  Sylvester J. Schieber and John B. Shoven 
those limiting the value of the preferences accorded pensions in the federal tax 
code, on the other. From the passage of ERISA in 1974 until the early 1980s 
concerns about benefit security held the upper hand in driving federal policy 
toward pensions. Since 1982, policies aimed at limiting tax leakages related to 
employer-sponsored retirement plans have played the dominant role. While a 
number of  tax law changes have had an effect on defined-contribution plans 
since 1982, the effects on defined-benefit plans have been considerably more 
profound. This was especially true of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of  1987 (OBRA87). 
Defined-benefit plans have a special appeal for workers because they ensure 
a promised level of benefits regardless of  the gyrations in financial markets. 
Over the years, defined-benefit plans have had a special appeal for employers 
because they have provided the flexibility to fund promised benefits actuarially 
over the working lives of their employees. Traditionally, actuarial funding al- 
lowed employers to advance fund for benefits that increase steeply at the end 
of workers’ careers. Through 1987 employers were allowed to fund up to 100 
percent of the projected benefits that would be paid to a worker at retirement 
based on his or her current tenure, age, and actuarial probabilities of qualifying 
for a benefit in the future. OBRA87 dropped the full funding limits for defined- 
benefit plans from 100 percent of ongoing plan liability to 150 percent of bene- 
fits accrued to date. 
The net effect of the new funding limits under OBRA87 was to delay the 
funding of an individual’s pension benefit relative to prior law. Table 5.2 helps 
to show the implications of  the revised funding standards. For purposes of 
developing this example, we assumed that a worker begins a job at a firm at 
age 25 earning $25,000 per year.  We  assumed that the worker’s pay  would 
increase at a rate of  5.5 percent per year throughout his or her career. This 
individual participates in a defined-benefit plan that pays 1.25 percent of final 
average salary per year of  service at age 65. We  assumed that accumulated 
assets in the plan would earn a return of 8 percent per year. 
The column of the table labeled “Projected Unit Credit Contribution Rate” 
shows the contribution rate, as a percentage of the worker’s salary, that would 
be required to fund this individual’s benefit at retirement under the projected 
unit credit funding method. The other four contribution rates in the table show 
what the effect of imposing a funding limit of  150 percent of accrued benefits 
would have on workers affected at four different points in their careers. The 
column labeled “Age 25” was developed assuming that the worker is covered 
by  the more restrictive funding limit throughout his or her career. The “Age 
35,” “Age 45,” and “Age 55” columns were developed assuming that the new 
funding limit was not imposed until the individual had already participated in 
the plan for 10, 20, and 30 years, respectively. 
For the worker who is covered by OBRA87 throughout his or her career, the 
full funding limits mean that the plan sponsor’s contributions to the plan during 
the first half of the worker’s career, until age 45, will be less than if  the plan Table 5.2  Effects of OBRAS7 Full Funding Limits on Contribution Rates for 
Workers at Ages  when Implemented 
Contribution Rates at Various Ages 
under Funding Limit of  150 Percent of 
Accrued Benefit 
Projected Unit Credit 
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were being funded on an ongoing basis. Of course, lower contributions in the 
early part of the worker’s career mean that contributions in the latter half of the 
career would have to be higher to fund the promised benefits under the plan. 
In this particular example, the contribution rate to the plan during the worker’s 
early to mid-fifties  would  have to be  more than  twice the contribution  rate 
under the projected unit credit funding method. 
For the worker not hit by the contribution limits until he or she is 10 years 
into the career, the imposition of the contribution limit implies that the em- 
ployer  would  have  a  nine-year  contribution  holiday  when  no contributions 
would be made. In this case, the accrued benefit would have to catch up with 
the level of funding accomplished early in the career. Again, the contribution 
rate in the mid-fifties would be more than twice what it was under projected 
unit credit funding. For the worker not hit until age 45, the contribution holiday 
would be shorter, but the same general effect of  delaying retirement funding 
would  significantly  increase  late career contribution  requirements  given the 
level of promised benefits. Finally, for the worker not hit until age 55 by the 
new funding limit, the contribution holiday would only be one year, and while 
contributions  during the remaining  career would  be higher  than  under  pro- 
jected unit credit funding, the implications are far less significant than in the 
previous cases. 
In 1988, when OBRA87 funding limits took effect, the leading edge of  the 
baby boom generation was 42 years of age. The trailing edge was 24 years of 
age. The gross effect of OBRA87 is that it has significantly delayed the funding 
of the baby boom generation’s defined-benefit retirement promises. Given the 
significant numbers of workers falling within the baby boom cohorts of work- 
ers, OBRA87 has meant an overall slowdown in pension funding. As this legis- 
lation was being considered, The Wyatt Company analyzed its 1986 survey of 
actuarial assumptions and funding covering 849 plans with more than  1,000 
participants to estimate the effects of the new funding limits. They found that 
41 percent of the surveyed plans had an accrued benefit security level of  150 
percent or greater. All of these plans would have been affected by the new limit 
and could not have received deductible contributions had the proposed limit 
been in effect for 1986. For a subset of 664 plans where they could estimate 
the marginal effects of the new limits, they found that 40 percent  would be 
affected by the new proposal, compared with only 7 percent under prior limits 
(Wyatt Company 1987,4). 
In its  1987 survey of actuarial assumptions and funding, The Wyatt Com- 
pany reported that 48 percent of the plans had an accrued benefit security ratio 
of  150 percent or more. Because plans at this funding level cannot make de- 
ductible plan contributions, the percentage of plans overfunded by  this mea- 
sure should decline over time. In its 1992 survey, Wyatt found that 37 percent 
of  large defined-benefit  plans still had accrued benefit security ratios of  150 
percent or greater (Wyatt Company 1992,4). 119  Population Aging and Private Pension Fund Saving and Asset Markets 
While OBRA87 significantly limited the funding of defined-benefit plans, it 
was only one piece of legislation out of several that affected the funding of 
tax-qualified retirement plans after 1982. In  1982, the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (TEFRA) reduced and froze for a period of time the dol- 
lar  funding  and  contribution  limits  for both  defined-benefit  and  defined- 
contribution plans. TEFRA also established new discrimination tests that had 
the practical effect of lowering contributions for many plans. The next year, 
the Deficit Reduction Act extended the freeze in the funding and contribution 
limits established by TEFRA. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 again reduced and 
froze funding and contribution limits for tax-qualified plans. Finally, the Omni- 
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of  1993 (OBRA93) included provisions that 
reduce the level of individual employee’s compensation that can be considered 
in funding and contributing to tax-qualified plans. The practical effects of the 
OBRA93 provisions will be to further limit the funding of employer-sponsored 
retirement programs. 
Figure  5.2  shows  annual  employer  contributions to  private  pension  and 
profit-sharing plans dating back to the period just after the end of World War 
11. There was a gradual increase in contributions up through the early 1970s, 
and then an escalation in contribution levels as ERISA was passed and imple- 
mented. But right around the time that the federal government started passing 
the various restrictive tax measures affecting employer-sponsored retirement 
plans, contributions began to decline. By 1990, employer contributions to these 
plans were about 15 percent below contribution levels in the early 1980s. On 
an inflation-adjusted basis, contributions in 1990 were at about the same level 
they had been in 1970, four years before the passage of ERISA. 
Most of the pension legislation passed in the past decade has evolved within 
the context of short-term fiscal considerations. The need to raise revenues to 
reduce the federal government’s deficit has delayed the funding of the baby 
boom generation’s  pension benefits with virtually no consideration of the long- 
term impact on the cost or viability of those benefits. While the Social Security 
Act established a Board of Trustees to oversee the financial operations of the 
OASDI programs and requires that the board report to the Congress on the 
financial and actuarial status of the programs, there is no similar oversight body 
to identify pending problems with the funded pension system and to warn poli- 
cymakers about them. Retirement plan sponsors are individually required to 
disclose the current funding status of their plans on a periodic basis, but the 
evolving policy  focus pushing  plan  sponsors to fund for only current obli- 
gations  hardly  encourages  planning  for  longer-term contingencies.  In  the 
aggregate, public policymakers have completely ignored the long-term impli- 
cations of tax policy on pension funding in an attempt to minimize the short- 
term structural imbalances underlying  federal fiscal policy. In the following 
sections of  this paper we attempt to lay out a longer-term view of pension 
funding. 120  Sylvester J. Schieber and John B. Shoven 
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Employer contributions to private pension and profit-sharing  plans  Fig. 5.2 
Source: National Income and Product Accounts 
5.2  Methodology of Current Study 
This section gives a brief outline of  the underlying methods, assumptions, 
and inputs that were used to develop the estimates that are presented in the 
next section of  the paper. Projections of  the U.S. pension system require a 
long-term projection of  the population and  workforce and their respective 
characteristics. For purposes of this exercise, we were not interested in devel- 
oping a long-term demographic and labor force projection model. First of all, 
to develop such a model would have been a more herculean undertaking than 
we were prepared to commit to in the time frame we had. Second, we felt the 
nature of the projection we were making might lead to comparisons with the 
long-term Social Security projections and thought that it would make sense to 
have the same underlying demographic and workforce characteristics as uti- 
lized in developing those projections. Thus we began with the Social Security 
Administration’s  75-year projections of the U.S. population, which gave us esti- 
mated numbers of people by single year who had attained ages between 0 and 
99 for each of the projection years. We  also started with their projections of 
the workforce in each year, distributed in five-year age cohorts. 
We  utilized published data and our own computations developed from the 
Department of Labor’s Form 5500 pension reporting forms plus computations 
from the March 1992 Current Population Survey (CPS) and the 1991 Survey 
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to develop age- and sex-specific 
participation and vesting in and receipt of  benefits from defined-benefit and 
defined-contribution plans. We  developed age- and sex-specific distributions 
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participants in pension plans. We  developed estimates of  total wages for the 
private, state and local, and federal sectors of the economy from data published 
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the National Income and Product Ac- 
counts. Estimates of age- and sex-specific pay levels were developed. 
We  used the Labor Department’s Form 5500 files in conjunction with data 
from the Employee Benefit Research Institute’s Quarterly Pension Investment 
Report (QPIR) to estimate the starting total distribution of assets and contribu- 
tions between defined-benefit  and defined-contribution  plans. We also used the 
QPIR data to estimate the distribution of financial assets held by plans across 
various forms of investments. The resulting distribution of assets by  plan type 
is  shown in table 5.3.  We  are focusing on the private-defined benefit  and 
defined-contribution plans in this paper. We  note with interest the relatively 
large amount of cash and other short-term investments held by these pension 
funds, despite the long-run nature of  the funds themselves. Equities, which 
have a superb track record over long holding periods, amount to only 36 or 41 
percent of the total portfolio. Given historic returns, the pension funds would 
be better off with a larger stake in stocks. Our assumed real rates of return for 
the different asset categories are also shown in table 5.3. The numbers are 
loosely based on the information in Ibbotson (1993), although we are admit- 
tedly conservative. Ibbotson reports that the geometric average real rate of re- 
turn for the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock portfolio over the years 1926-92 
was 7.0 percent. The corresponding average real rate of  return on long-term 
corporate bonds was 2.3 percent, while it was 0.5 percent for short-term Trea- 
sury bills. We  do not have any corresponding data for guaranteed investment 
contracts, which  are fixed-income contracts, typically issued by  insurance 
companies, and featuring a somewhat shorter maturity than long bonds. As the 
Table 5.3  Asset Allocation of Pension Plans as of July 1992 (percent) 
Type of Plan 
Guaranteed 
Investment 
Equities  Bonds  Contracts  Real Estate  Cash 
Private defined benefit  36  33  0  15  16 
Private defined contribution  41  14  13  6  26 
Federal defined benefit  44  44  1  6  5 
Federal defined contribution  30  70  0  0  0 
State and local defined benefit  44  44  1  6  5 
State and local defined contribution  33  49  5  8  5 
Real rate of return  5  2  I .2  2  0 
Blended real rate for private DB plans: 2.76 
Blended real rates for private DC plans: 2.646 
Source: For asset allocation, Employee Benefit Research Institute, Quarterly Pension Investment 
Report; for rates of return, authors’ assumptions. 122  Sylvester J. Schieber and John B. Shoven 
reader can see, we have consistently assumed rates of return somewhat below 
the long-run averages calculated by Ibbotson. 
The Social Security population projection was distributed by  age, sex, and 
workforce participation for each year of  the projection. Our analysis distrib- 
uted the workforce into three separate sectors, the private employment sector, 
the state employment sector, and the federal employment sector. The working 
population was further distributed by tenure and pension participation status. 
In each year of the projection, the population and workforce were rolled for- 
ward one year with appropriate  mortality  decrements  and workforce adjust- 
ments to account for job leavers, entrants, and changers. We had an underlying 
assumption that there was  14 percent turnover of workers between jobs each 
year. 
The projections were developed separately for private employer plans, state 
and local defined-benefit plans, and the federal employee thrift plan. In each 
case,  separate  projections  were  developed  for  defined-benefit  and  defined- 
contribution plans and then aggregated. For example, in the case of the projec- 
tion for the private  sector, we estimated that total employer contributions to 
private plans were 2.8 percent of payroll, approximately 30 percent of which 
has been going into defined-benefit plans in recent years. Employee contribu- 
tions to private plans were estimated to be 1.75 percent of payroll, with slightly 
less than 2 percent of that going to defined-benefit plans. Based on estimates 
from the Form 5500 files of plans with 100 or more participants, we estimated 
that employer contributions to defined-contribution plans were 1.13 times em- 
ployee contributions to those plans. 
In the initial year, benefits were estimated from the Form 5500 files and the 
QPIR data. Going forward, benefits  were estimated on the basis of workers 
being covered by  a pension and passing into immediate retirement starting at 
age 54. At that age, we assumed 3.7 percent of existing workers would retire. 
By age 80, we assumed all remaining workers would retire. For workers who 
terminated their employment under a defined-benefit plan, if they were vested 
we assumed they would be paid a deferred benefit at age 65. The accrual rate 
of the benefit formula for people working up until retirement calculated out to 
be  1.25 percent of final salary per year of service on average. For people re- 
ceiving a deferred benefit it was 1  .OO percent of final salary per year of service. 
For people participating in a defined-contribution plan, we assumed that 40 
percent of the workers who terminated prior to retirement would take a lump- 
sum benefit  and use it for some purpose other than meeting their retirement 
needs. For defined-contribution plans generally, benefits commence at retire- 
ment and are paid out as an annuity over a maximum of 30 years. 
Future contributions and trust fund accumulations are driven in large part 
by economic assumptions. Our assumptions on inflation, 4.0 percent per year, 
and wage growth, 5.1 percent per year, correspond with those used in the Alter- 
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5.3  Projections for the Private Pension System 
The current  dollar  figures  of  our  projections  for  the  combined  defined- 
benefit and defined-contribution private pension plans are shown in table 5.4. 
Under the assumptions of our forecast, the assets of the total private pension 
system are shown to continue to grow in nominal terms for the next 60 years. 
However, this growth is almost continuously  slowing. For instance, in  1993 
the benefits  (payouts) of  the defined-benefit  and defined-contribution private 
plans combined are 82.3 percent of total contributions. This means, of course, 
that there is a net inflow of  funds into the total system, even without taking 
into account the investment return on the $3 trillion  asset pool. However, by 
the year 2006, benefits are projected to be 102.4 percent of contributions, and 
we expect that aggregate benefits will continue to outstrip contributions for the 
entire remaining period through 2065. By 2025 benefits are projected to be 
163 percent of contributions. 
If inflation and asset returns match our assumptions, the value of pension 
assets will continue to climb, albeit at slowing rates until peaking (in nominal 
terms) in 2052. In real or relative terms, however, pension assets are projected 
to peak and begin to fall much earlier. Our model indicates that the ratio of 
pension assets to total payroll (now at 1.245) will climb modestly until reach- 
ing a peak of  1.362 in 2013 and 2014. The ratio is projected to fall after that 
and drop below  1  .0 for the first time in 2038. Real inflation-adjusted pension 
assets would peak in 2024 with our set of assumptions. 
The important story coming from our analysis is that private pensions will 
gradually cease being the major engine of aggregate saving that they have been 
for the past 20 years or more. This projected occurrence is shown in figure 5.3. 
Here we show the total real  saving of  the private pension  system (projected 
contributions less benefits plus real inflation-adjusted asset returns) relative to 
the projected  total private payroll in the economy for  1992 to 2065. We  use 
total private payroll as the scaling factor simply because it is a readily available 
by-product of the Social Security forecasting operation. What figure 5.3 shows 
is that under our assumptions the pension  system continues to generate  sig- 
nificant investable funds for the American economy for the next 20 years or 
so. In fact, the decline is very minor for about the next  10 years and then it 
steepens considerably. By 2024 the pension system is projected to cease being 
a net source of saving for the economy. In fact, the pension system will then 
become increasingly a net dissaver. By 2040 the net real dissaving is more than 
1.5 percent of payroll, and by 2065 the negative saving is projected to reach 
almost 4.0 percent of payroll. This change of the pension system from a large 
net producer  of  saving to a large absorber of  saving or loanable funds will 
likely have profound implications for interest rates, asset prices, and the growth 
rate of the economy. 
It should be emphasized that the timing of the prediction of  the change in Table 5.4  Combined Private Defined-Benefit and Defined-Contribution Projections 
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0.01  240 
0.01063 2018  13,402,189  648,802 
2019  14,026,726  698,513 
2020  14,662,45  1  75 1,265 
2021  15,306,337  806,645 
2022  15,959,825  864,634 
2023  16,621,581  925,853 
2024  17,289,921  989,525 
2025  17,964,262  1,055,792 
2026  18,644,009  1,125,128 
2027  19,327,899  1,197,367 
2028  20,015,646  1,271,896 
2029  20,705,722  1,349,723 
2030  21,398,659  1,430,323 
2031  22,092,937  1,512,302 
2032  22,790,312  1,597,600 
2033  23,488,690  1,685,872 
2034  24,189,257  1,778,429 
2035  24,889,191  1,875,903 
2036  25,584,589  1,977,573 
2037  26,274,467  2,082,637 
2038  26,955,952  2,192,273 
2039  27,626,183  2,306,337 
2040  28,286,875  2,426,835 
2041  28,933,672  2,552,646 
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9,938,106  0.00890 
10,453,567  0.00714 
10,993,210  0.00522 
11,558,981  0.00357 
12,15  1,004  0.00192 
12,774,036  0.00027 
13,429,026  -0.00128 
14,121,320  -0.00275 
14,852,756  -0.00417 
15,627,696  -0.00546 
16,45131  1  -0.00672 
17,324,066  -0.00781 
18,243,015  -0.00886 
19,212,820  -0.00970 
20,244,774  -0.01053 
21,329,161  -0.01 120 
22,476,016  -0.01191 
23,683,343  -0.01267 
24,948,948  -0.01337 
26,286,980  -0.01406 
27,696,937  -  0.0 1473 
29,176,895  -0.01523 
30,725,273  -0.01577 
32,348,308  -0.01632 
34,051,585  -0.01695 
(continued) Table 5.4  (continued) 
Year  Assets  Benefits  Contributions  Investment Income  Net Inflow  Real Net Inflow  Total Payroll  Saving/Payroll 
2043  30,168,355  2,828,664 
2044  30,743,421  2,979,900 
2045  31,280,831  3,139,932 
2046  31,771,610  3,308,622 
2047  32,208,542  3,487,113 
2048  323  1,595  3,675,560 
2049  32,881,416  3,875,283 
2050  33,096,607  4,087,847 
2051  33,214,933  4,312,374 
2052  33,224,620  4,548,s 13 
2053  33,113,607  4,798,158 
2054  32,866,701  5,062,265 
2055  32,465,756  5,344,679 
2056  31,885,693  5,641,642 
2057  31,111,167  5,950,656 
2058  30,122,673  6,274,655 
2059  28,898,715  6,615,627 
2060  27,411,408  6,972,036 
2061  25,649,398  7,347,019 
2062  23,567,160  7,741,093 
2063  21,153,092  8,152,261 
2064  18,364,332  8,584,350 
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Real saving of private pensions relative to total private payroll, 
pensions from a net buyer of assets to a net seller is very sensitive to our as- 
sumptions about the rates of  return earned on pension investments as well as 
to the assumed level of pension contributions.  However, we feel that the pattern 
of figure 5.3 is almost inevitable; only the timing could be somewhat different 
than pictured. If investment returns exceed our fairly conservative assumptions, 
then the decline of the saving contribution of pensions will be delayed in time. 
Still, the demographic structure is such that the decline will by necessity occur. 
Higher investment returns would result in more saving in the early years and 
even more dissaving in the later years of our analysis. It is not even correct to 
think of the dissaving as a negative development. After all, pension assets are 
accumulated to provide the resources needed by the elderly in retirement. It is 
only natural that when we have an extraordinarily large number of retirees, the 
real assets of the private pension system will shrink and the system will at least 
temporarily cease to be a source of new investment funds for the economy. 
One concern that all of this may raise is the impact on the prices of pension 
assets, mainly  stocks and bonds. We  share that concern to some degree but 
cannot predict the size or timing of any effect. One thing to note in this regard 
is that, while the pension  system will become a less important purchaser  of 
securities, it will not become a net seller for quite a while. As noted earlier, our 
model predicts that benefits will first exceed contributions in 2006. However, at 
that point the annual investment income (dividends, interest, and capital gains) 
on the $7 trillion dollar portfolio should approximate $450 billion in nominal 
terms and $170 billion in real terms. Needless to say, there would be no reason 128  Sylvester J. Schieber and John B. Shoven 
to be net sellers of assets at that point in time, and in fact, we would suppose 
that pensions will still be accumulating assets then. The period of time when 
the pension system begins to be a net seller is more likely in the early part of 
the third decade of the next century under our conservative assumptions. This 
could depress asset prices, particularly since the demographic structure of  the 
United States does not differ that greatly from those of Japan and Europe, 
which also will have large elderly populations at that time. Another comment 
about the asset price effect is that if it occurs, it would likely affect all long- 
term assets. What we think may happen is high real interest rates that could 
depress the prices of  stocks, bonds, land, and real estate. While this might 
suggest that a good investment for this period would be short-term Treasury 
bills, the effect if it occurs is likely to be gradual and to last for decades. In the 
twentieth century the longest stretch of time over which Treasury bills outper- 
formed equities was about 15 years. We  have little else to go on, but we cer- 
tainly are not advocating that long-term investors invest in short-term instru- 
ments to ride out this demographic tidal wave. In fact, it is our opinion that far 
too many people invest in short-term instruments for long-term accumulations. 
With our assumptions, the private defined-benefit plans are the ones that 
experience net outflows (dissaving) the earliest. These plans are already in a 
situation where benefits exceed contributions. In  fact, benefits are roughly 
three times contributions. The robust investment returns of the past decade or 
so have permitted this and in fact forced it to be true. If investment returns drop 
to our conservative figures and if  firms contribute a total of  2.8 percent of 
payroll to pension plans, then the real assets of the defined-benefit plans begin 
to fall immediately. Defined-benefit pension assets (which are now 88 percent 
of the total payroll in the economy) would fall to 77 percent of total payroll by 
2000, 66 percent by  2010, and 42.5 percent by  2025. The net flow of funds 
into the defined-benefit plans (or savings) would be positive, but only in nomi- 
nal terms. Even nominal defined-benefit saving becomes negative by 2025, and 
the entire stock of defined-benefit plan assets would be exhausted by 2043. 
It is important to note that this is not a forecast of  doom for the defined- 
benefit plans; it is simply a “what if” exercise. If by  magic our rate of return 
assumptions proved to be precisely accurate, then employers would be forced 
to increase their pension contributions above the 2.8 percent of aggregate pay- 
roll that we have assumed or to curtail the pension benefits they offer workers. 
While vested benefits of existing workers cannot be cut, certainly the accrual 
of  new  benefits can be reduced by  changes in the plan design. This tough 
choice of higher costs or lower pension benefits would occur long before the 
2043 date when the model says that the assets of defined-benefit plans would 
be exhausted. Government regulators and pension actuaries would sound the 
alarm, hopefully decades before the forecast could come true. The problem 
may become apparent and the tough choice may have to be faced very early in 
the next century. One concern we have is that employers may have gotten used 
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benefit plans in recent years thanks to the extraordinary performance of finan- 
cial markets. When they face the higher long-run funding costs of their pension 
plans under more normal return realizations, they may choose to curtail the 
benefits that they offer. It is also possible that just about the time this is being 
resolved, we as a society will have to acknowledge that Social Security is not 
in long-run equilibrium; once again, the choice will be to either raise taxes or 
lower  benefits.  In  this  sense,  both  Social  Security  and  the  funded private 
defined-benefit pension system will likely face cost pressure to scale back re- 
tirement benefits. 
Under  our assumptions,  the outlook  for the defined-contribution  plans  is 
decidedly more optimistic. Our model shows defined-contribution plan assets 
growing relative to economy-wide aggregates over the next 30 years or so and 
then stabilizing at the relatively larger level. Again using total economy-wide 
private payroll as our scaling factor, defined-contribution assets are now about 
37 percent of one year’s payroll. We project those assets will climb to 52 per- 
cent of private payroll by 2000, to 70 percent by 2010, and to level out at about 
85 percent for 2025 and beyond. The defined-contribution system is much less 
susceptible to “running out of assets,’’ and indeed, we do not project any such 
occurrence. The private defined-contribution  system would be a modest net 
source of saving in the economy even in the period with the maximum number 
of baby boom retirees. 
5.4  Conclusions 
The major result of this paper is that the national  saving generated by  the 
private pension system can be expected to decline from current levels, gradu- 
ally for about a decade, and then far more steeply. With our set of conservative 
assumptions  about the  rate of return  earned by  pension  assets, the pension 
system would cease to be a source of saving roughly in 2024. It is our opinion 
that this will indeed happen, although there is considerable uncertainty about 
the timing of the event. 
We also find that the defined-benefit portion of  the private pension system 
faces a tough choice. Our model shows that the system would run out of money 
in 2043 if it were funded according to our assumptions and if rates of return 
were consistent with those we have projected. The running-out-of-money part 
of our story will not happen. However, what the model is implicitly predicting 
is  that  either  corporate pension  contributions  will  have to be substantially 
raised or pension plans will have to be scaled back. It is highly unlikely that 
the current low contribution rates, caused by the high realized rates of return 
on financial assets over the past decade, can be sustained. 
We briefly speculated about the impact of the reduced saving of the pension 
system on asset prices. Even though we do not think the change will be as 
dramatic as our model predicts (due to adjustments in contributions and plan 
design), we still feel that the demographic structure is such that a major change 130  Sylvester J. Schieber and John B. Shoven 
in pension saving will occur. The timing and magnitude of the effect on asset 
prices is impossible to determine. Capital markets are worldwide, interest rates 
are determined by both supply and demand, and forecasts of financial rates of 
return some 30 or more years into the future are futile. However, the population 
bulge that we call the baby boom caused considerable strain on the U.S.  educa- 
tion system in the 1950s and 1960s.  Absorbing those people into the workforce 
was a challenge in the 1970s and early 1980s and may have been a factor in 
slowing the growth in worker productivity. It is probably safe to say that the 
same numerous cohort will strain the economic system once again during their 
retirement years, roughly 2010 to 2050. 
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